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Abstract 
This paper briefly explores the social policy developments in Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia since the first establishment of Bismarck institutions in the period
antecedent to the end of World War II. In particular, it asks how and to what extent
Bismarck institutions survived,  adapted and evolved during the communist  and post-
communist  social  policy  re-organization,  as  well  as  asking  what  is  the  new internal
structure  of  these  welfare  states  in  transition. The  main  argument  is  that  the  four
Vizégrad countries have built their contemporary welfare state on the ruins and with the
ruins of the welfare state they had previously introduced, and that these welfare states
are facing a process of internal restructuring that leads to a hybridization of the system.
The paper also identifies four main welfare reform trajectories occurring since World War
II.  These  correspond  to:  the  golden  age,  the era  of  forced  expansion,  the  era  of
retrenchment’s attempts and the era beyond retrenchment. 
Introduction1
In 1989 Central and Eastern European policy makers were suddenly confronted with the
difficult task of restructuring a welfare state under a complete different economic and
political  system.  The  restructuring  of  welfare  institutions  accompanied  the
emergence of new and serious societal problems. More and more people were hit by
unemployment and poverty, the family pattern in force during communism had to be
re-discussed, and also protection during old age and sickness had to be renegotiated.
Reforms started immediately and involved important structural  changes. The four
Vizégrad2 countries  (Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland  and  Slovakia)  raised
retirement age and pension insurance contributions while reducing the pay-as-you-
go principle,  introduced health insurance while guaranteeing the access to health
care through the obligation of the state to ensure unprotected citizens, implemented
a  German-like  unemployment  insurance  consisting  usually  of  three  pillars
(unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance and social assistance), reduced
the excessive family benefits heritage of the communist system while continuing to
pursue a pro-natalist policy making and long-term child care (very often until the
child is enrolled in university education), as well as establishing a basic safety net for
those citizens at persistent risk of poverty.
Such  transformation  was  certainly  not  without  pain,  since  it  implied  a  redefinition
downwards of rights  and responsibilities,  previously generously granted by the state-
paternalist  welfare state. According to what principles will  the new society be based?
What kind of democracy will be introduced? And, more importantly, what kind of social
security system should be established in order to ensure a smooth transition from central
planned economy to a market economy? For policy-makers of the region, these were not
highly abstract questions, but practical and urgent ones. 
 
Despite  the  fact  that  great  attention  has  recently  been given  to  the  role  played by
institutions and path-dependent mechanisms in the development of European welfare
states  (see, for instance, Immergut 1992, 1998, 2005; Bonoli and Palier 1998, 2001;
Pierson 1996, 2000, 2004; Thelen 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005;  Ebbinghaus 2005,
2006), the possible outcome of such institutional transformations are still  object of a
1 In  writing  this  paper  I  have,  directly  and indirectly,  benefited  from several  discussions,  comments  and
critiques. I must give particular mention to  François Bafoil, Daniel Clegg, Michael Dauderstädt, Frank Ettrich,
Heiner Ganßmann, Karl Hinrichs, Nick Manning, Philip Manow, Julia O’Connor, Bruno Palier and Vivien Schmidt.
It goes without saying that whatever faults remain are entirely my own responsibility.
2 In February 1991, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland met in the city of Vizégrad  (Hungary) and agreed on
a “Declaration of Cooperation on the Road to European Integration”, which represented the first attempt to
establish a common platform to discuss their future in Europe. 
controversial debate. Here, the main problem is to characterize, in a clear manner, the
new internal configuration, which results from a continuous process of structuring, de-
structuring  and  restructuring  of  existent  welfare  institutions3.  The  literature  usually
addresses Central and Eastern European welfare states as extremely diverse and doomed
to follow, on a country basis, one of the Esping-Andersen’s (1990) three-fold typology.
For Bob Deacon (1992), Poland should have become a good example of “post-communist
conservative corporatist” welfare state, the Czechoslovakia of a social democratic model,
while Hungary a liberal welfare regime. More recently, Zsuzsa Ferge (2001) and Erzsbet
Szalai (2005a) have expressed their worries that Hungary might be on the move towards
the  liberal  welfare  regime,  whereas  another  Hungarian  political  scientist,  Julia  Szalai
(2005b), has affirmed that in Hungary, a mixture of corporatism and liberalism, was, in
reality, the main characteristic of the new welfare state. None of these authors, however,
has paid serious attention to the commonalities that the four Vizégrad countries shared,
even though it would have been interesting to understand how Bismarck institutions in
force before Word War II were adapted to the universal communist principles and, then,
eventually recombined in the new post-communist environment.
This paper aims at addressing this issue by asking how and to what extent Bismarck
institutions survived the communist and post-communist social policy re-organization, as
well  as  what  is  the  new  internal  structure  of  these  welfare  states  in  transition. As
anticipated  in  previous work (Cerami  2005),  Central  and Eastern  European countries
seem to develop around a new welfare logic, which combines, in a path-dependent and
innovative way, components of Bismarck social insurance, of communist egalitarianism
and of liberal market orientation. In short, it includes elements of each of the Esping-
Andersen’s three-fold classification.  
Contrary to common assumptions that look at the establishment of welfare institutions as
being implemented by design or as the result of an aseptic policy transfer, this paper will
argue that the four Vizégrad countries have built their contemporary welfare state on the
ruins, and with the ruins, of the welfare state they had previously introduced in the pre-
communist and communist period. The reason for the inclusion of these countries in the
family of Bismarckian welfare states lies, therefore, not only in the fact that they have a
long tradition of Bismarck social insurance and are usually considered the front-runners
of reforms that might be implemented elsewhere4, but also in the fact that Bismarck
3 For the concept of “structuring, de-structuring and restructuring” welfare institutions, see Bartolini (2005) and
Ferrera (2005).
4 The three-pillar scheme of pension was introduced in Hungary and Poland well before it was tested in Western
Europe. Similar considerations can be made for the NDC (notional defined contribution), which was launched in
Latvia in January 1996 and in Poland well before it was introduced in Sweden and Italy.
institutions,  established  before  World  War  II,  lived,  adapted  and  evolved  during  the
communist  social  policy  re-organization  from  1945  to  1989,  and  also  succeeded  in
surviving  the,  perhaps,  even  more  rapid  structural  transformation  following  the
dissolution of the central planned economy.
For the purpose of fluidity, after briefly summarizing the economic and political situation
of the four Vizégrad countries, as well as discussing the influence that policy discourses
and international organizations had on national policy outcomes, the transformation, and
the origins of these welfare states in transition in the main historical contexts (pre 1945,
communist and post communist) will be examined. Each period comprises an analysis of
the change in four institutional variables (the mode of access, the benefit structure, the
management of the system and the financing mechanism5), as well of the main welfare
reform trajectories. The aim here is to highlight the main features that constitute the
basis for a correct understanding of current welfare state developments. 
Economic and Political Situation
The collapse of the Iron Curtain coincided not only with a new wave of democratization in
Europe (Huntington 1991),  but also with the emergence of mass unemployment and the
consequent rise in poverty and income inequality (see, for instance, Nesporova 2002,
European Commission 2004, UNECE 2004, Alam et al. 2005). Just to quote few examples
of the difficult socio-economic situation that the four Vizégrad countries faced, and are
still facing, real GDP growth reached 1989’s levels only in Poland by the mid 1990s, but
not before the beginning of 2000 in Czech Republic,  Hungary and Slovakia. Inflation,
which remained constantly high during the entire period of transition, drastically reduced
the purchase power of households. Hungary and Poland were the countries that suffered
more with an average annual inflation rate running between 20% and 30% during the
first five years and about 10% afterwards. The annual inflation rate in the Czech and
Slovak Republics,  however,  stabilized under  the  threshold  of  about  10% only  in  the
second half of the 1990s. Similarly, the employment ratios decreased between 1989 and
2000, from 87% to 71% in Czech Republic, from 83% to 63% in Hungary, from 75% to
62% in Poland and from 80% to 57% in Slovakia (TransMonee 2005). In 2005 GDP per
5 As conceptualized by Bonoli and Palier (1998, 2001 p.59), these four institutional variables, more or less,
correspond to four main principles (1) the rules and criteria governing eligibility and entitlement: who is entitled
to the benefit?;  (2) the forms taken by the benefits: what  types of  benefits  are provided?;  (3)  financing
systems: who pays and how?; and (4) the organization and management of the scheme: who decides and who
manages? (quoted in Background Paper of the Project, pp. 5-6). 
capita in PPs6 (EU25=100) remains between half and two-thirds7 of the EU158 average,
while the total employment rate is equal to the EU15 average (65%) only in the Czech
Republic, but substantially lower in Poland (53%), Hungary (57%), and Slovakia (58%).
The  unemployment  rate,  which  is  now close  to  the  EU15  average  (7.9%) in  Czech
Republic (7.9%) and Hungary (7.2%), remains dramatically high in Poland (17.7%) and
Slovakia (16.4%). Similarly, the number of people at risk of poverty, raised especially
during the first years of transition, is now below the EU15 average of 15% in the Czech
Republic (8%) and Hungary (12%), but still higher in Poland (17%) and Slovakia (21%)
(Eurostat  2006).  In  plain  numbers,  these  percentages  correspond  to  800  thousand
people at risk of poverty in Czech Republic, 1.2 million in Hungary, 6.5 million in Poland
and 1.1 million in Slovakia (Cerami 2006a, p.18). 
Under these conditions of economic instability, it comes as no surprise that the voting
behaviour of Central and Eastern European citizens has been greatly influenced by the
economic situation of the country. Countries that have faced greater economic instability
have also witnessed greater political instability (see Table 1). In the Czech Republic, the
Klaus governments have not been reconfirmed in the elections of 1998 and 2002 due the
persistence of the economic crisis, which has delegitimized his reform path. In Hungary,
centre-right and centre-left coalitions have both paid high costs for the painful reforms
implemented. For example, the centre-right coalition under Prime Minister József Antall
(Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF) was  not reconfirmed in the elections of 1994 for
having advocated the necessity of introducing a market-economy in the fastest possible
way, the elected centre-left coalition (1994-1998) under the leadership of Gyula Horn
(Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP) after having attempted to introduce a set of austerity
measures  in  1995  (the  so-called  Bokros-package),  and  the  FIDESZ-MPP  (Alliance  of
Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party) led government coalition of Viktor Orbán (1998-
2002) for having pursued cuts in protection against unemployment policies. Similarly in
Poland,  from the date of the first totally free parliamentary elections of 1991, centre-
right and centre-left coalitions have not succeeded in lasting for more than one legislative
term due to the persistence of a severe economic crisis. The unexpected change in voting
behaviour, following the introduction of the  Balcerowicz Plan in 1990, that saw the re-
elections of the ex-communists only few years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, is probably
the most emblematic example of how the electoral results in the region have been linked
to the economic performance of the country. The political survival of Vladimir Mečiar in
6 GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), (EU-25 = 100).
7 In 2005, GDP per capita in PPs (EU 25=100) was equal to 73 in the Czech Republic, 62 in Hungary, 50 in
Poland and to 55 in Slovakia, against an average of 108 in the EU 15 (Eurostat 2006).
8 The  EU-15  includes  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Slovakia was also made possible thanks to the violent political debate that the nationalist
Slovak leader conducted in the media accusing Václav Klaus with his neo-liberal reform
plan of being the enemy of the Slovak citizens.
Table 1 Elections in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (1989-2006)
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovak Republic
Czechoslovakia:
1989 Federal Assembly  
1990 centre-right 
(CF/VPN) 
1992 centre-right 
(ODS/HZDS)
1993 Dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia
Czech Republic:
1993 centre-right 
(ODS-led coalition) 
1998 centre-left 
(ČSSD-led coalition)
2002 centre-left 
(ČSSD-led coalition)
1988 Round Table
1990 centre-right 
(MDF-led coalition)
1994 centre-left 
(MSZP-led coalition)
1998 centre-right 
(FIDESZ-MPP led 
coalition)
2002 centre-left 
(MSZP-led coalition)
2006 centre-left (MSZP-
led coalition)
1989 Round Table
1989 centre-right 
(Solidarity-led coalition) 
semi-free elections
1991 centre-right
(Solidarity-led coalition)
1993 centre-left
(SLD-led coalition)
1997 centre-right
(Solidarity-led coalition)
2001 centre-left
(SLD-led coalition)
2005 right-nationalist
(PiS-led coalition)
Czechoslovakia:
1989 Federal Assembly  
1990 centre-right (CF/VPN)
1992 centre-right 
(ODS/HZDS)
1993 Dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia
Slovak Republic:
1993 nationalist
(HZDS-led coalition)
1994 nationalist
(HZDS-led coalition)
1998 centre-right
(KDH-led coalition)
2002 centre-right
(SKDU-led coalition)
2006 new elections   
17.06.2006
Source: Cerami 2005, pp. 13-17; Parties and Elections in Europe : http://www.parties-and-elections.de/
Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), Civic Forum (CF), Public against Violence (VPN), Civic Democratic Party
(ODS), Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), Alliance of Young Democrats-
Hungarian Civic Party (FIDESZ-MPP), Democratic Left Alliance (SLD),  Law and Justice (PiS),  Movement for a
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), Christian Democratic Movement (KDH),  Slovak Democratic and Christian Union
(SKDU).
Policy Discourses and International Organizations 
Numerous  studies  have  often  emphasized  the  crucial  role  played  by  international
organizations in influencing the post-communist social policy reform process (Deacon et
al. 1997; Orenstein 1998, 2005; Müller 1999, 2002, 2004; Manning 2004; Cerami 2005).
The most common approach to welfare state transformation in the region sees, in fact,
international  organizations  as  extremely  successful  in  influencing  the  policy  direction
through  binding  directives or  through  forms  of  moral  suasion.  Examples  of  binding
directives  can  be  found  in  the  World  Bank  and  the  IMF’s  conditionality  strategy  for
granting access to loans (or in the case of the  Accession Agreements during the EU
Enlargement process), while an example of  moral suasion can be found in the OECD’s
Economic Surveys (McBride and Russel 2001) or in the EU policy evaluation reviews with
their attempt to show governments what good policy-making should look like.
Policy  discourses (see Schmidt  2000,  2002),  promoted by international  organizations
have,  undoubtedly,  influenced  national  policy-making  by  increasing  trans-national
communication and thus convergence to already identified policy priorities. In the case of
the World Bank and the IMF, the policy discourse has primarily focused on the need for a
market-oriented, financially stable and residual welfare state. The EU, on the other hand,
has been influential not only in cognitive terms (Guillén and Álvarez 2004; Guillén and
Palier 2004; Ferge and Juhász 2004;  Lendvai 2004, 2005; Manning 2006), increasing, for
example, trans-national solidarity and mutual learning, but it has also been a vital actor
in  facilitating  the  introduction  of  new  social  policy  ideas,  interests  and  institutions
(Cerami 2006b).  The new social policy ideas introduced by the EU have coincided with
keywords such as activation in the labour market (see also Clasen 2000), sustainability
and  adequacy  in  the  pension  sector,  as  well  as  sustainability,  accessibility  and high
quality in the health and long-term care sector. Here, the focus has been put not only in
the financial sustainability of the system as promoted by most financial institutions, but
also in its adequacy, quality and accessibility (see Mandin and Palier 2002 for France).
The introduction of these new social policy ideas has inevitably resulted in the formation
of new interest-based relations. These have included, for example, the development of
strategic interactions and bargaining activities between the various Ministries of Finance,
of Social Affairs and the new pension, health care and social insurance funds. Neither
ideas  could  be  heard  nor  interests  could  have  been  expressed  if  the  necessary
institutions would not have been in place. These institutions have included, for instance,
those administrations related to the management and monitoring activities of the new
social policy organization at national, regional and local level (such as new ministerial
departments or social insurance agencies, and their regional and local offices).
Here, it should be remembered, however, that even the most convincing discourses tend
to be mediated in their acceptance by the individual’s own preferences. Transformation in
Central and Eastern Europe has, in fact, not been simply the result of silent or semi-silent
acceptance of prescriptions respectively trough  policy transfer or  policy diffusion9, but
rather as a result of a recombinant policy implementation, in which existing institutional
structures have constrained and/or fostered the full completion of reforms. 
9 For the most recent debate on policy transfer, policy diffusion and policy convergence, see the special edition
of the Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 12, Number 5 / October 2005.
In fact,  it  should not be forgotten that  the introduction  of a  welfare  state  based on
professional diversity and private arrangements was not only the most suitable scheme if
the  historical  background  of  these  countries  is  taken  into  account,  but  it  also
corresponded  to  the  functional  necessity  of  occupational  and  market  diversification,
which stemmed from the excessive centralized and homogenized economic system in
force during communism. In this context, it is not surprising that more than ten years
after  the  first  attempts  of  the  World  Bank  to  see  its  policy  prescriptions  fully  and
successfully  implemented,  its  Operations  Evaluation  Department  (OED)  desolately
concluded that more attention to the existing institutional and administrative capabilities
of the countries should have been given in order to ensure a more consistent policy
execution (World Bank -OED- 2004). 
In attempting to assess the real impact on national policy making, it must certainly be
remembered  that  international  organizations  have  been  important  facilitators (Ekiert
2003; Inglot 2003, p. 242; O’Connor 2005) in the social policy reform process, but this is
still not sufficient to address them as the  only causes responsible for specific outcomes.
The presence of social insurance institutions still based on the professional activity, even
though encapsulated in the central planned economy, inevitably influenced further reform
options  of  the  Vizégrad countries.  As  it  will  be  shown in  the  following  sections,  the
reinforcement of schemes based on the payment of contributions and on the professional
record of workers was the natural option of a system which previously worked on full-
employment,  as well  as  the establishment  of  social  insurance funds  was the  natural
option on the side of the management and financing mechanism, which, in reality, never
disappeared from the scene but  continued within the state budget. Once the communist
state collapsed and with it, numerous enterprises, the organs responsible for proofing
and managing the benefits had to be replaced in order to ensure the survival of welfare
institutions.  Clearly,  the  market  was  the  only  available  option  and  with  the  market
strengthening the importance of independent social insurance funds became unavoidable.
In  addition,  despite  strong  pressures  from  international  financial  institutions,  policy
recommendations  have tended to  be mediated and negotiated in the political  arena,
according to clear institutional rules, instead of having been implemented by design. Just
to quote few but notable examples. The introduction of the three pillar-scheme in Poland,
proposed by the Minister of Finance Grzegorz Kołodko, was blocked for two years by the
opposition from the Minister of Labour and Social Policy Leszek Miller. The decision of
Miller was moved by his commitment to the PAYG principle and by his personal rivalry
with Kołodko (quoted in Nelson 2001, p. 244). In Hungary and Slovakia, the introduction
of the three-pillar scheme was also subjected to several discussions among politicians
and social policy experts and only at the end of a difficult process of political bargaining
was finally introduced. In the Czech Republic, by contrast, agreement on the three-pillar
scheme was not found primarily due to the strong opposition by the trade unions (Fultz
2002). 
1. The Period Before 1945
1.1 Institutional Background
Until 1918, the territories now comprising the Czech and Slovak Republic were part of the
Austro-Hungarian  Empire.  Hungary,  occupied  by  the  Ottoman empire  for  150  years,
gained independence from the Turks in 1686, but became immediately afterwards part of
the Austro-Hungarian monarchy until its independence in 1920. Over a period of several
hundred years, Poland was under the foreign domination of Russia, Austria, and Prussia,
and whose governments greatly influenced its internal organization after independence.
In fact,  during the period immediately antecedent the end of World War II,  the four
Vizégrad countries remained continuously subjected to the regulations and administration
of the occupying forces, which greatly modelled not only the character and the borders of
these  nation  states,  but  also  their  social  security  system  implemented  according  to
Bismarck principles.
A  brief  overview of  pre-communist  pension  systems  shows,  for  example,  that  these
countries had already established some form of Bismarck-style pension insurance, which
linked the access to benefits to professional status. This link was particularly strong in
the  Czech Republic  and the now independent  Slovak Republic10,  in  Hungary11 and in
Poland12. In the years 1906 to 1933, the numerous funded pension schemes established
were  based  on  a  corporatist  vision  of  social  solidarity,  primarily  aiming  to  secure
occupational standards.  Health care was also provided on the basis of the professional
activity and financed primarily through social insurance contributions. In Czech Republic
and Slovakia, the  first  health  policy  was introduced in  1918, when the  Czech Lands
declared their independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The first fully functional
health insurance system, however, came into force in 1924 with the adoption of the
Health Insurance Act, which provided coverage for employees, approximately one-third
of the total population. Hungary emanated the first act on public health in 1876 (Act XIV
of 1876). According to the law, the eligible poor obtained free health care at special
surgeries. Corporatist social insurance was the foundation of the system. Health care was
delivered through the private sector and in some state hospitals. Poland, which has a
long tradition of Bismarck social insurance, dates the first legislation back to 1918. This
10 Law of 1906 for salaried employees and Law of 1924 for wage earners.
11 Law of 1912 and Law of 1928.
12 Law of 1927 for salaried employees and Law of 1933 for wage earners
system  provided,  however,  very  limited  coverage  with  only  seven  per  cent  of  the
population insured.
The  benefit  structure  also  clearly  reflected  a  Bismarckian  orientation.  As  mentioned,
pension and health care benefits were associated to the employees’ insurance record and
aimed at reproducing the professional achievements.  Pension benefits  were earnings-
related, while the access to health care services, obtainable in public as well as in private
practices,  depended  on  the  payment  of  health  insurance  premiums  or,  when  not
available, by payments in cash. This system was highly non-egalitarian and a significant
segment of the population remained uninsured.
The management of the social security system was fairly decentralized. The responsibility
for  old-age  and  health  care  protection  was  primarily  given  to  local  communities  or
workers’  associations,  which had the duty  to ensure a minimum level  of  subsistence
(rather than a minimum living standard) to their members. State intervention in workers’
life  was minimal  and primarily  relegated to resolve workers’  disputes.  The increasing
internal  tensions  caused  by  the  very  low  living  standards  of  factory  workers  and
agrarians associated to the possible spread of socialist ideals forced the governments of
these countries to adopt the strategy developed by Bismarck. The maintenance of social
peace  was  then  linked  to  the  introduction  of  occupational  based  schemes,  in  which
central authorities had only limited regulatory powers (primarily legislative rather than of
supervision). 
The  main  financing  mechanism  was  social  insurance  contributions,  which  aimed  at
covering individuals primarily against the risks associated with old-age and health. There
was  a  basic  social  safety  net  for  the  poor,  sponsored  by  the  state  or  by  charity
organizations, but this net did not aim at guaranteeing minimum living standards, but
rather temporarily aimed to alleviate extreme poverty.
2. The Period from 1945 to 1989
2.1  Economic  System,  Welfare  State,  Political  Institutions  and  Interest
Representation during Communism
Forty years of Soviet occupation had a huge impact on the past and current Central and
Eastern European political, economic and social structure, with important repercussions
on  the  economic  organization  of  the  countries  subjected  to  Russian  domination,  the
political and welfare institutions introduced, the profile and responses of governments as
well as the structure of organized interests. The central planned economy regulated all
spheres of social life. This was a highly centralized system of resource production and
allocation. As Kornai described (Kornai 1980), Central and Eastern European economies
were “economies of shortage”, which preferred scarcity of products to inflation. Policy-
makers developed five years plans in which the economic priorities and objectives of the
country  were  identified  and  pursued  (Kornai  1992).  Unfortunately,  the  information
required  for  the  complex  mathematical  calculations  was  insufficient  or  simply  not
available and the final result was poor economic performance. 
The  welfare  state  was  part  of  the  central  planned  economy  and  built  on  a  mix  of
corporatism  and  universalism.  The  Soviet-style  economies  were  based  on  full-
employment and this ensured that the corporatist basis of the system achieved universal
coverage (see also Standing 1996). Pensions, for example, were based on contributions
and, in theory, linked to the professional status, but the equalization of wages as part of
the communist ideology, transformed contribution-related into flate-rate benefits. Health
care was granted free of charge and provided under the so-called Semashko model. This
was  a  centralized  system  of  health  care  planning  and  distribution,  with  decisions
primarily taken at the national level, rather than by local administrations (Kornai 2001).
Family benefits were extensive and primarily aimed at consecrating the role of women as
wives-mothers-workers13, rather than to ensure a fully gender neutral society.
Serious  structural  economic  problems,  however,  did  exist.  The  Soviet  Union  had
delegated to each country a specific economic task, favouring mono-sectoral to multi-
sectoral productive activities (Bafoil forthcoming). This had the obvious result of making
the countries dependent on the import of goods. Despite the mass shift from agrarian to
industrial  societies,  cross-national  differences  persisted  among  the  four  Vizégrad
countries  during  the  entire  period  of  Soviet  occupation.  In  the  Czech  part  of  the
Czechoslovakia, for example, the industrial sector was more developed than in the Slovak
side, which, in turn, still  presented several deficiencies typical  of an agrarian society.
Farmers  were  also  an  important  group  in  Hungary  and  in  Poland,  even  though  the
presence and significance of industries incessantly grew during the 1950s, 1960s and
1970s  (Adamski et. al. 2001; Machonin et al. 2001; Spéder et al. 2001; Tuček 2001;
György and Róbert 2003).
As far as political institutions and the associated interest representation is concerned, the
four Vizégrad countries inherited a highly centralized and totalitarian political structure
(Glaeßner 1994), which was only drastically reformed in 1989. As already known, the
communist system was a one-party system. The politbüro was the centre of the political
13 On the role  of women as wives-mothers-workers, see Makkai (1994),  Paci (2002),  Pascall  and Manning
(2000),  Fodor et al. (2002), Fultz and Steinhilber (2003), Manning (2004), Cerami (2005), Pascall and Kwak
(2005).
decision-making and from the politbüro the communist nomenklatura also decided the
economic  priorities  of  the  centralized  country.  No  federal  state  was  allowed  during
communism, since this may have represented a threat to the Soviet domination. Hence,
no  regional  requests  could  be  expressed  or  heard14.  With  regard  to  interest
representation, despite the presence of special privileges to particular professional groups
(such as miners, police, or armed forces) (Bafoil  forthcoming),  only the trade unions
officially attached to the communist party were allowed in the political arena and, as a
consequence, they represented the interests of the communist leaders rather than the
interests of workers15. To use Hirschman’s (1970) terminology, in the communist system,
no real voice or exit options were possible, but only loyalty (or rather forced loyalty) to
the state apparatus was accepted.
The  totalitarian  political  system  and  the  absence  of  an  open  structure  of  interest
representation  had also  several  negative  repercussions in  the private  life  of  citizens.
Since voices could neither be expressed nor heard, anomy and apathy among citizens
were the norm. This resulted in servility (or forced servility) of the individuals to state
organs as well  as to the formation of a dual personality  (Szalai  2005a). Central  and
Eastern European societies were, as a consequence, atomized societies, where people
searched refuge in the private life, trying to develop “connections” (e.g. with the mayor
of the city or the manager of their enterprise) in order to have access to a better life on
an individual and private basis, rather than openly according to well defined rules in the
public sphere.  
The existence of a monolithic structure of power, however, does not mean that changes
in the system, even small, could not occur. The centralized political institutions, in fact,
were forced gradually to deal with the increasing aspirations in decision-making of the
peripheral  zones,  especially  present  in  Hungary  and  Poland.  It  is  also  questionable
whether only one economic system existed during communism. In Hungary, for example,
Hankiss (1991) and many others have spoken about the existence of a second economy,
where  the  emergence  of  small  private  businesses  was  tolerated  by  the  communist
leaders in order to compensate citizens for the shortages of the official economic system.
The  existence  of  a  second  economy  also  led  other  authors  to  talk  about  the  slow
emergence of a “second society” within the official communist one (Ettrich 2003;  King
and Szélenyi 2004; Szalai 2005a). This was not only the case of Hungary, but also of
Poland and, to a lesser extent, due to its industrial character, of the Czechoslovakia. The
14 Requests for a federal state, however, existed and were particularly strong in Czechoslovakia (Vodička 2005).
15 In many large state-owned enterprises, there were also special offices ruled by the secret police which had
the function of listening for voices of dissent in the factory and immediately re-establishing the order (Bafoil
forthcoming).
emergence of alternative forms of interest representation did not only emerge within this
second economic sub-system, but could also slowly be witnessed in the public scene. The
circles of dissidents and intellectuals in Hungary (see Konrad and Szélenyi 1978; King
and Szélenyi 2004), the civic movement Charta 77 in Czechoslovakia or the trade union
Solidarnosch in Poland are few but notable examples of the disintegrating tendencies that
grew within the communist system. 
2.2 The “Golden Age” of Central and Eastern Europe 
The  years  from  1950s  to  1970s  are  usually  defined  the  “Golden  Age”  of  Western
European welfare states, whose main characteristics were a rapid increase in welfare
expenditures,  but  also,  and  more  importantly,  a  rapid  expansion  in  entitlement  and
eligibility criteria for accessing benefits. Did the golden age of Western European welfare
states  coincide  with  the  golden  age of  Eastern  Europe?  Even  though  it  might  seem
implausible due to the huge differences present in the economic structures of the two
societies, the two golden ages practically coincide, and also for similar reasons. As Szalai
(2005a) has pointed out, Western European nations were not alone in the world and all
of them were confronted with the social, economic and technological achievements of
their, at the time, enemies of the Warsaw Pact. Similarly, Central and Eastern European
societies were not immune to the cultural, political and social achievements of Western
societies,  but  were  forced  to  deal  with  their,  at  the  time,  corrupt  alter  ego.  The
development of an extensive welfare state in Europe able to ensure universal coverage
for the citizens should, in fact, be explained not only in terms of class struggles as the
power resource model would suggest (see Korpi 1983, Esping-Andersen 1985; Baldwin
1990), or as a result of deindustrialization (Iversen 2005) or again as the consequence of
increasing  global  economic  competition  (Rieger  and  Leibfried  2003),  but  also  as  an
outcome of the strategy of confrontation during the Cold War. 
The  process  of  modernization  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  started  with  the
development of heavy industry in the 1950s, which resulted in an extraordinary increase
in living standards. These, however, were maintained artificially high, for political and
propaganda purposes, beyond the real possibilities of the central planned economy. The
artificial raise in living conditions through various state subsidies coupled with a constant
increase in military expenses put the productive and distributive capacities of the central
planned economy under great financial pressure. Constructing an always larger number
of nuclear missiles, submarines, or engaging in the “space race” with the United States
were extremely  expensive political  exercises that,  in  some way,  had to  be financed.
Funds could only be raised at this point either from a reduction in expenditures for those
policies  indirectly  aimed  at  subsidizing  the  economy  and,  hence,  at  raising  living
standards  (such as price subsidies  or subvention to modernize the firms) or,  as last
resort, from an increase in external debt. The latter option was the one preferred by
almost all countries. By 1989, for example, the gross convertible external debt reached
USD 7.9 thousand million in Czechoslovakia, USD 19.2 thousand million in Hungary, and
USD 40.8 thousand million in Poland (Szalai 2005a, p. 32). 
Nevertheless, by  the  end  of  the  1980s,  the  welfare  state,  which  was  continuously
expanding16, financed through external debt, was no longer able to ensure the social
stability it had ensured previously after the attempts of revolt in Budapest in 1956, after
the Prague Spring in 1968 and in Poland in the early 1980s. These were, in fact, not only
the years where the communist system vacillated due to mass demonstrations, but also
the years in which political  leaders consolidated their power through an expansion in
welfare provisions (Szalai 2005a). The establishment of an extensive welfare state was,
thus, the reward that Eastern citizens received in exchange for their liberty, whereas the
institutionalization of welfare rights, that had radically increased during the 1960s and
1970s, functioned in legitimizing the political system introduced by dictatorship. Despite
increased  attempts  to  increase  the  distributive  possibilities  of  the  central  planned
economy, already grown to limits through external funding, the dissatisfaction among
citizens, already high, grew, leading to the collapse of the system on 9 November 1989,
day of the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
2.3 Welfare Reform Trajectories before the Fall of Communism 
At first glance, the primary characteristic of contemporary Central and Eastern European
systems  of  social  protection  is  the  implementation  of  third  order  (or  paradigmatic)
changes,  since  a  simultaneous  transformation  in  all  the  components  of  policy  (the
instrument settings, the instruments themselves, and hierarchy of goals behind policy)
(Hall 1993, Palier 2000, Bonoli and Palier 2001) seems to have only occurred since 1989.
A  new  benefit  system,  new  modes  of  entitlement  and  calculation  for  retirement,
unemployment,  health,  family  and  social  assistance  provisions  have  been  introduced
under a new welfare logic, which aimed at conducting a shift from the communist state-
paternalism to a market-oriented welfare  state, based, if still not on individual, then at
least on semi-individual responsibility. However, it is important to remember that first
and second order changes were already initiated before 1989. 
16 Please note that it would be impossible to analyze social security expenditures in CEE without considering
other “indirect social policies” such as job security, price subsidies, subvention to firms, to house, education,
etc.  In  fact,  as  Simpura  (1994,  p.150)  has  emphasized,  all  policies  were  “social”  by  definition  during
communism.
In the Czech and Slovak Republic, the labour code dates back to 196517 and has been
used as the reference text for current legislation on labour and employment.  Similar
considerations  apply  to  labour  inspection  and  labour  safety18,  to  maternity  leave,
maternity benefits and children’s allowances19, medical care and sickness benefits20, and
to pensions21 (ILO 2005, Natlex Database). The mass demonstrations in 1968, however,
did not lead to a faster implementation of reforms, as in Hungary after the protests in
1956 and in Poland in  the early  1980s,  but  rather  to  a welfare  state  reorganization
anchored  in  the  communist  orthodoxy.  In  fact,  after  the  Prague  Spring,  the  Czech
Republic went through the so-called process of “normalization”, which involved not only
the  re-introduction  of  old  political  rules,  but  it  also  coincided  with  the  dismissal  of
numerous party officials, managers, academics and journalists. The economic, political
and scientific elite was soon replaced with persons more loyal to the communist system.
The then reforms in the social security system recently introduced as part of the reform
package of Alexander Dubček were temporarily frozen. “Normalization” in the welfare
state  primarily  involved the  attempts  of  decentralization  of  tasks  and responsibilities
under the federal reform proposal, which would have inevitably meant an increase in
local authority over the management of the social security system, but also attempts at
differentiating the access and entitlements to pensions, health care and family benefits.
In Hungary,  several  modifications to the communist  style social  security system took
place, since the end of 1960s, involving medical care and sickness benefit22, pensions23,
17 Labour Code No. 65/1 of 1965 regulated the workers’ relations.
18 Act  No.  174  of  1968  on  State  Inspection  of  Labour  Safety.  It  regulated  the  rights,  functions  and
competencies of labour inspection bodies.
19 Act  No.  88/1968 on  maternity  protection.  It  concerned  the  extension  and  new entitlement  criteria  for
maternity leave, maternity benefits and children’s allowances. 
20 Act No. 54/1956 on employees’ sickness insurance.
21 Several modifications concerning pension benefits, entitlements and social insurance contributions occurred
since 1960s. A detailed list is provided by Mrázová et al. (2004).
22 Act No. II of 1975 on social insurance (with later amendments).
23 Act No. II of 1975 on social insurance (with later amendments); see also Ordinance No. 1 of 1971 of the
Ministry of Health with respect to yearly increases in old-age pensions; Regulation No. 6 of 1970 of the National
Council  of  Trade  Unions  on  mutual  old-age  pension  insurance  for  agricultural  co-operative  workers;
Government Ordinance No. 18 of 1969 on compulsory retirement pension insurance for handicraft; Decree No.
42 of 31 December 1969 on the introduction of compulsory old-age pension insurance in private commerce;
Regulation No. 12 of 1968 of the National Council of Trade Unions on the amount of old-age, disability and
survivors’  benefits  for  rural  workers  granted  on  the  basis  of  the  length  of  their  membership  of  rural
cooperatives. 
employment24, social assistance25, equality between men and women26, as well as the
social  security  general  standards27 (ILO  2005,  Natlex  Database).  Here,  due  to  the
introduction  of  the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 1968, Bismarckian principles,
such  as  differentiation  of  access  and  provisions,  were  more  easily  pursued  than  in
Czechoslovakia. “Goulash Communism”, the particular Hungarian way between market
and socialism, introduced by the Kádár government in order to pacify the requests of the
population humiliated by the repression of 1956, had obvious repercussions in the social
security  system.  These  repercussions  involved  not  only  universal  extensions  in  the
pension  and  family  benefit  sector  (Ferge  1979;  Szalai  2005a),  but  also  the  indirect
acceptance of principles based on differentiation of provisions, professional activity and
contribution records. In the late 1980s, due to serious fiscal crisis, Hungary decided to
separate the social security fund from the state budget, thus differentiating pensions,
family  benefits,  sickness, maternity and other social  security payments (Müller  1999;
Inglot 2003, p.221)
Similarly in Poland, the reform of the communist-style welfare state began in the early
1960s and concerned all  spheres of the social  security system, including the general
24 Labour Code of 1967 regulated the workers’ relations; see also Ordinance No. 2 of 1970 on respecting the
employment  of  younger  workers;  Ordinance  No.  8  of  1970  of  the  Minister  of  Labour  on  respecting  the
settlement of labour disputes (with later amendments); Act No. II  of 1975 on social  insurance (with later
amendments); Decree No. 20 of 1979 of the Ministry of Labour on respecting collective bargaining; Decree No.
10 of 1981 on respecting the protection of labour. 
25 Decree No. 9 and No. 18 of 1979 of the Minister of Labour on social and cultural benefits.
26 Government Ordinance No. 16 of 1966 on family allowances (with later amendments); Government Order
No. 103 of 1970 on the improvement of the economic and social condition of women; Act No. II of 1975 on
social insurance (with later amendments); Decree No. 6 of 1982 of the Ministry of Health on protection of the
health of women and young children. 
27 Act No. II of 1975 on social insurance (with later amendments).
standards28,  pensions29,  medical  care  and  sickness  benefit30,  maternity31 and
employment32 (ILO 2005, Natlex Database). The 1970s workers’ demonstration under the
Gierek  regime  opened  the  door  for  heavy  occupational  lobbies  (Inglot  1994,  2003,
p.220), notably the requests of farmers for an extension in pension and health insurance,
while the presence of the strong trade union  Solidarity, particularly active in the early
1980s,  allowed an increase in the requests  of  industrial  workers exacerbated by the
continuous  deterioration  of  their  life  and  working  conditions.  Inglot  (2003,  p.  220)
noticed, for instance, that during the crisis of 1980-1982 the share of cash benefits in
overall  social  spending unexpectedly jumped from 47 to 57 percent.  Interestingly,  in
1987,  two  years  before  the  collapse  of  communism,  the  Jaruzelski  government  also
decided to separate the Social Insurance Fund from the state budget (Inglot 2003, p.
221), concluding the reform attempts initiated some decade before.  
2.4 The Four Institutional Variables
Following the Soviet occupation after World War II, the dominant Bismarckian mode of
access to benefits was not completely abolished by the communist regime, but rather it
was expanded in order to bring it in line with the egalitarian aspirations of the Bolshevik
revolution.  Here,  it  is  important  to  point  out  that  the  communist  understanding  of
citizenship coincided with the idea of the perfect communist worker (such as Stakanov).
Every citizen had the right and obligation to work not only for the sustenance of his or
her family, but also for the economic development of the country (Ferge 1979). As a
consequence, welfare rights and entitlements continued to be based on the professional
activity,  but  the corporatist orientation was covered up by the egalitarian communist
28 Order of the Council of Ministers concerning workers’ rights to social security contributions (Text No. 211 of
1987);  Act  on  respecting  the  organization  and  financing  of  social  security,  including  social  insurance
contributions (Text 202 of 1986); Order of the Council of Ministers on the organization and rules of the Social
Insurance Institution. 
29 Act  on  retirement  pension  schemes for  workers  and their  families   (Text  No.  267 of  1982) with  later
amendments;  Act  respecting  the  organization  and  financing  of  social  security  including  social  insurance
contributions (Text No.  202 of 1986); Decision No. 142 of 1986 of the Council of Ministers on periods of
employment necessary to pension security; several decrees and government orders concerning remuneration
and  entitlements of benefits since the end of 1960s. 
30 Act on cash social insurance benefits (Text 185 of 1975) with  later amendments; Act on retirement pension
schemes for workers and their families  (Text No. 267 of 1982) with later amendments; Order of the Minister of
Labour, Wages and Social Affairs on the calculation of social security allowances (Text 336 of 1974).
31 Decision No. 58 of the Council of Ministers on unpaid leave for working mothers with children (Text 154 of
1968); Order of the Minister of Labour, Wages and Social Affairs on the calculation of social security allowances
in the event of sickness and  maternity (Text 336 of 1974). 
32 Labour Code of 26 June 1974 with several amendments; Act on State Employment Fund (Text 334 of 1983)
first  establishment in  1974 (Decision No. 44 of the Council  of Ministers); Decision of the Council  of State
respecting the registration of the newly established trade unions (Text 104 of 1980); Act on respecting trade
unions (Text 212 of 1982).
propaganda and by the fact that there was practically no unemployment. Clearly, things
went differently for those minorities, who were, for some reason, outside of the labour
market  (such  as  Roma,  pensioners,  handicapped).  In  this  case,  the  universal  and
egalitarian aspirations of the communist regime faced a drastic slowdown. Poverty and,
what nowadays we would call,  social exclusion were associated with an implicit social
stigma. In the eyes of the many citizens that regularly took part in the economic, social
and political life, being the beneficiary of some form of social assistance benefit (in-kind
or in-cash) was inevitably the result of a reactionary or, in the worst case, of a counter-
revolutionary behaviour (Milanovic 1995; Cerami 2005). 
With  the  introduction  of  the  central  planned  economy,  the  benefit  structure  was
equalized. Flat-rate rather than contributory benefits became the new characteristics of
the  pension  system,  while  universal  and  standardized  treatments  were  the  norm in
public, state-run hospitals. Unfortunately, the egalitarian aspirations of the communist
nomenclature did not coincide with a positive performance of welfare institutions. A poor
working life was usually followed by a poor retirement (Connor 1997), while health care
services were highly inefficient and characterized by high morbidity rates (Deacon 2000).
The  extremely  differentiated  schemes  established  during  the  Bismarckian  period  in
Eastern Europe were put under the control of central authorities, with social insurance
revenues  and  expenditures  becoming  integral  part  of  the  central  planned  economy.
Social insurance contributions, which persisted in these countries even during the 1970s,
were  transferred  to  the  state  budget  (or  in  funds  within  the  state  budget)  and,
subsequently,  redistributed  to  the  entire  population.  The  management  of  the  social
protection  system  was  highly  hierarchical  and  based  on  a  top-down  approach.  The
Ministry  of  Social  Affairs  (or  Health)  planned  the  relative  policies.  These  were  then
implemented by local authorities on the basis of the decisions and the national priorities
taken at the central level, often with little or no knowledge of local real needs. Trade
unions were also in charge of social insurance administration, but since only the official
communist  trade  union  was  allowed,  the  independence  from  state  authority  was
extremely limited.  The access to  welfare  benefits,  by contrast,  followed a bottom-up
direction and was characterized by a high degree of discretion of those officials who were
responsible to grant the benefits. In order to get access to welfare provisions (such as
pensions, maternity leaves, etc.), state-factory workers usually informed (or asked the
permission of) their supervisors at the work place, who then gave the request to the
state-factory managers. These finally gave the consensus on the access of benefits33. A
33 The main argument for the management of social policies at the firm level was based on the assumption that
this  kind  of  decentralization  would  have been helpful  to  better  meet  local  needs,  if  compared to  the low
administrative  capabilities  of  central  public  administrations.  Moreover,  the allocation of  resources was  also
clientelist access to welfare provisions soon became a normal praxis, and is of particular
interest for the understanding of current social policy developments. Loyalty to the state
apparatus in exchange for short- and long-term benefits (such as better jobs, longer
holidays, better houses, access to prestigious schools and universities) created circles of
clienteles around local party officials and administrators that tend to persist even to the
present day34.
Although state participation in the financing of the communist welfare state was greatly
enlarged, social  insurance contributions did not completely disappear from the scene.
While in Czechoslovakia, social insurance premiums were automatically included in the
state budget35, in Hungary and Poland they were still considered to be a separate part of
social security receipts. As Table 2 shows, during the period from the 1960s to the end of
the 1980s, the receipts from employers’ contributions in Hungary were equal or higher
than  state  participation  receipts,  while  the  contributions  paid  by  the  insured
corresponded  to  approximately  one-fifth  (slightly  below 20%) of  total  social  security
revenues. In Poland, the largest part of total social security receipts was paid through
employers’ contributions, which remained constantly higher than the receipt coming from
state participation, and that covered the low revenues of insured premiums.
supposed to be just among workers, who, according to the communist propaganda, were at the same time
employees and owners of the state factories. This kind of arrangement should then have helped to improve the
productivity of workers (Ferge 1979). 
34 Interview with ILO-SRO Expert, Budapest, 30 July 2002: “One of the important problems regarding the
socialist social security heritage is the continuation of forms of patronage [The interviewer suggests the word
“clientelism”. We both agree on that]. During socialism, for instance, the state companies controlled everything.
[Interviewer: Yes, I know, being manager of a state company meant deciding who gets benefits and under
what circumstances. But, now, most of these actors are changed. Being a member of the communist party is no
more a determinant factor]. Yes, but forms of “clientelism” are still in place. An example is the existence of
“gratitude money” in the health care sector.
35 This was probably a reaction of the communist government to the  Prague Spring. In fact, while after the
demonstrations in Hungary in 1956 the government responded by making liberal concessions to the populations
in exchange for social peace, in Czechoslovakia the response was primarily concerned with re-establishing the
communist orthodoxy. 
As  Manow and  Plümper  (2005)  have  demonstrated,  the  ways  how a  welfare  state
expands may depend on the existing financing structure of welfare institutions (tax vs.
social  insurance contributions),  but  also by the degree of freedom of the institutions
responsible for monetary policies. In economies based on central planning, as mentioned,
the  main  characteristic  was an ambiguous  contributions-oriented system that  equally
redistributed  the  resources  collected,  while  the  institutions  responsible  for  monetary
policies were fully subjected to the state authority. It comes then as no surprise that
rising contributions also coincided to an increase in an external debt as it happened in
countries with a low degree of central bank independence and Bismarckian welfare states
such as Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain (see Manow and Plümper  2005).
3. The Period from 1989 onwards
3.1 Welfare Reform Trajectories after Communism
At the beginning of the 1990s, structural reforms were implemented that remained under
the dominant Bismarckian logic introduced in the pre-Soviet period and continued even
during communism. Welfare benefits granted on the basis of professional activity and
according to the work record of individuals continued to be financed through the payment
of  social  insurance  contributions,  which  this  time,  however,  were  redistributed,  to  a
lesser  extent,  among  the  population  in  absence  of  a  centrally  planned  economic
mechanism.  Professional  diversity,  differentiation  of  provisions  and  privatization  of
schemes soon became the keywords of the new post-communist consensus.  In short,
three  sequences  of  reforms  can  be  identified  since  the  collapse  of  communism:  (1)
Table 2. Social Security Receipts: Percentage of Contributions paid by Insured Person, Employers and State Intervention
Czechoslovakia 
Yea
r
insure
d
employer
s
state
interventio
n
196
3 2 33 65
196
6 0 35 65
197
1 0 3 97
197
4 0 3 97
197
7 0 3 97
198
0 0 4 96
198
3 0 4 96
198
6 0 4 96
199
0 0 4 96
Hungary 
Year insured
employer
s
state
Interventio
n
1963 12 47 42
1966 14 40 46
1971 17 52 31
1974 17 43 40
1977 16 46 38
1980 14 40 46
1983 15 47 38
1986 21 79 0
1991 25* 75 0
Poland
Year insured
employer
s
state
interventio
n
1963 0 63 37
1966 1 61 38
1971 10 54 36
1974 4 59 37
1977 1 57 42*
1980 2 52 46
1986 3 61 36*
1989 2 70 28*
1990 3 68 29*
Source: ILO/MZES 2001. Author's calculations.
*Estimated
forced expansion, (2) attempts at privatization, and (3) re-adjustment (see Table A.1 in
Appendix).
3.1.1 First Sequence of Reforms
The first sequence coincided with the  temporary growth of welfare provisions called to
help  the  democratic  transition  of  Eastern  Europe.  The  new  problem  of  mass
unemployment resulting from the dismissal of workers of state-owned enterprises was
first tackled by the introduction of extensive early retirement policies, followed by the
establishment of relatively far-reaching unemployment and social assistance programmes
(Standing 1996; Kapstein and Madelbaum 1997; Milanovic 1995, 1998; Vodopivec et al.
2003). Vodopivec et al. (2003, p.6) have shown, for example, that these countries have
not  only  spent  considerable  resources  on  promoting  early  retirement  (reaching  0.8
percent  of  GDP  in  Slovakia  in  1992),  but  also  that  the  replacement  rate  and  the
generosity of unemployment benefits decreased only in a second phase of transition.
However, during this phase, not only temporary emergency policies were implemented,
but also the first steps for future, long-lasting reforms were taken. The CV/VPN and ODS-
led governments in Czech Republic and the HZDS-led government in Slovakia, the MDF
and  the  MSZP-MPP  coalitions  in  Hungary,  and  the  Solidarity–led  alliances  in  Poland
started,  in fact,  the first attempts to move away from the old pay-as-go-system, by
creating the basis for the future adoption of the three pillar schemes (or private funds in
the case of the Czech Republic). This also included the reinforcement of principles based
on pension insurance, as well as a slow raise in retirement and contribution rates, which
remained set at an extremely low level during the entire communist period (usually 60
years for men and 55 years women, with approximately 25 years of service). In the
health care sector, the main characteristics of reforms were the reintroduction of health
insurance,  a  clearer  separation  in  the  management  and  financing  the  system  (from
taxation to contributions and from the state budget to separate funds), as well as the
establishment of private practice. On unemployment and social assistance, this involved
the introduction of  unemployment insurance, as well as the establishment of a basic
social safety net.  Finally,  on family benefits,  the temporary maintenance of extensive
family policies had the aim of cushioning some of the costs of transition, since policy-
makers in the region saw family protection as the most effective way to target poor
people (Interview no. 2). 
3.1.2 Second Sequence of Reforms
Of  course,  the  early  generosity  soon  became  unsustainable,  especially  due  to  the
escalating  number  of  unemployed.  The  second  sequence  of  reforms,  attempts  at
privatization, were introduced in order to reduce the expansion of the welfare state. The
measures used to prevent such uncontrollable extension of rights and claims were again
primarily rooted in the Bismarckian tradition. These  involved, of course, the privatization
of provisions, as sponsored by the most influential international financial institutions, as
well as also and, perhaps, more importantly, the reinforcement of principles based on
professional  diversity.  A  process  of  monetarization  and  individualization  of  risks  and
responsibilities (Ettrich  and Cerami  forthcoming)  was then enclosed in  a Bismarckian
welfare logic, which saw in the establishment of insurance-related pension, health care
and unemployment schemes. This seemed the best way to cut expenditures, while, at
the  same  time,  ensuring  professional  diversity  and  market  orientation.  In  Hungary,
attempts at retrenchments were carried out by Finance Minister Lajos Bokros in 1995,
who unsuccessfully tried to introduce a set of austerity measures (the so-called Bokros
package) with the aim of making family allowance no longer universal and automatic, of
conducting  a  shift  from  flate-rate  to  means-tested  benefits,  of  reducing  child-care
assistance and of introducing the tuition  fees for  universities.  In Czech Republic,  the
Klaus  governments  pushed  for  a  drastic  reduction  in  the  protection  against
unemployment policies especially during the second half of the 1990s. Fascinatingly, the
policy discourse during these years reached a peak in neo-liberal orientations with some
Czech officials affirming that unemployment was something natural and beneficial for the
country.  If  no  unemployment  would  have  existed,  then  something  would  have  been
wrong with the country (Consensus II 1999: Czech Republic, Part IV, p.150). In the mid
1990s, a report called Security through Diversity also opened a temperamental debate in
Poland  between  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  the  Ministry  of  Social  Affairs  on  the
incontrovertible necessity of drastic social security reforms. Similarly in Slovakia, violent
discussions on the necessity of privatizing health and pensions also took place at about
the same time. It is not by chance that most pension and health care reforms (notably
the  full  introduction  of  the  three  pillar  scheme  in  Hungary  and  Poland,  and  the
reinforcement of health insurance principles in Czech and Slovak Republic) took place
close to the end of the 1990s. These were, undoubtedly, the years where endogenous
and exogenous economic vulnerabilities became stronger and actions were addressed as
urgent by the national, as well as by the international, community, but these were also
the years where the Bismarckian character of welfare institutions was reinforced on the
basis of the country’s historical background. 
Interestingly,  the left/right  divide was not a determinant factor for party preferences
towards neo-liberal or social democratic reforms. In fact, not only centre-right parties,
like the ODS-of Vaclav Klaus in Czech Republic, have opted for welfare cuts, but also left-
wing governments, like the MSZP of Gyula Horn in Hungary, or the catholic  Solidarity
coalitions in Poland36. One plausible explanation for the rather unusual behaviour of left-
wing parties is the one provided by Müller (1999, 2002, 2004), who sees such reform
attempts as driven by the necessity of left governments, on the one hand, to increase
their international legitimacy after forty years of communism, while, on the other, to let
the population digest more easily the absolutely necessary reforms. Right-wing parties
would  have  not  had,  in  fact,  the  same  moral  authority.  The  Nixon  goes  to  China
Syndrome (Müller 1999, 2002, 2004)  seems, as a consequence, to have characterized
the politics of social security reforms of left wing-parties in the first years of transition,
even though this does not seem to be the case nowadays (see below).
3.1.3 Third Sequence of Reforms
Owing  to  problems  connected  with  the  growing  number  of  unprotected  citizens
attempting  to  claim from the  already indebted  social  insurance  funds,  the  excessive
optimistic vision of market-driven change did not survive its arrival. The third sequence
of reforms, strongly characterized by policy learning dynamics  (on policy learning see
Hemerijck  2005),  was  that  of  recasting (Ferrera  and  Rhodes  2000)  or  recalibrating
(Pierson  2001)  the  neo-liberal  approach  introduced  by  most  Central  and  Eastern
European  governments.  In  Czech  Republic,  numerous private  health  insurance  funds
evaluated  as  unable  to  provide  minimum standards  for  their  clients  have  now been
abolished,  while  in  Hungary  the  compulsory  affiliation  to  the second private  pillar  of
pension,  once  mandatory  for  younger  generations,  has  been  eliminated.  In  Poland,
unemployment benefits still financed by employers’ contributions are now granted on a
flate-rate rather than on an occupational basis so as to reduce the financial pressure
caused by raising unemployment, whereas in Slovakia the full implementation of a strong
market-oriented  health  insurance  is  facing  increasing  policy  resistance  due  to  the
universal requirements expressed by the Slovak Constitution. 
How  can  such  change  in  orientation  be  explained?  Undoubtedly,  blame  avoidance
(Pierson 2001) and  credit claiming (Mayhew 1974) strategies now play a greater role
than in the past. Politicians are, in fact, increasingly searching for ambiguous political and
policy agreements in order to see their economic and social policy goals implemented,
while, at the same time, trying to ensure the continuation of their own political career37.
36 The  Solidarity coalitions  represented  the  political  wing  of  the  Polish  catholic  trade  union  and,  as  a
consequence, should have opted, in a more determined way, for a workers’ friendly transformation.
37 The most emblematic example is provided by the so-called “opposition contract” between the ODS and the
ČSSD in the Czech Republic. The pact between the two main leaders, as Vodička (2005, pp. 145-146) explains,
was: Miloš Zeman would have renounced his position as Secretary of the ČSSD in order to be elected as
candidate super partes to the next presidential elections of 2003, while Václav Klaus would have received, in
exchange for his support, the position of Prime Minister in the ODS minority-led government. When Zeman
appointed Vladímir Špidla as his successor, it was implicit that tolerance for Klaus’ economic preferences would
Political leaders staying in the government are also more often claiming responsibility for
the “missed disaster”, which would have followed the non-implementation of reforms.
Also  parties  in  opposition  affirm  with  more  determination  responsibility  for  having
avoided even a more painful  economic transformation through their  blockades in the
parliament. The most recent election results in the Vizégrad countries can, perhaps, be
used as a good indicator of how the approach of politicians will inevitably tend to be more
cautious. In Czech Republic, for example, the  ČSSD centre-left coalition was elected in
1998  and  reconfirmed  in  2002  primarily  thanks  to  its  opposition  to  the  neo-liberal
reforms proposed by Vaclav Klaus.  Klaus  was,  in  fact,  famous among the public  for
advocating a “market democracy without adjectives”, where the adjective was clearly
“social”. Similarly, centre-left coalitions in Hungary, guided by the ex-communists of the
MSZP, survived not only a political  scandal  that involved the ex Prime Minister Péter
Medgyessy,  accused  of  having  been  an  ex  communist  spy,  but  have  also  been
reconfirmed in 2006, this time under the guide of Ferenc Gyurcsány. In Poland, after the
introduction  of  drastic  social  security  reforms  in  1998,  the  Solidarity centre-right
government was forced to leave the place to a centre-left coalition. In the next elections
of 2005, a right-nationalist government, whose main parties have the very telling names
of Law and Justice (PiS), Self-Defense of the Republic  of Poland (SO) and League of
Polish Families (LPR), unexpectedly won the majority in the parliament. Also Slovakia has
seen the alternation of various coalitions, even several times within the same legislature,
whose main internal conflicts were not only caused by the authoritarian leadership of
Vladimir Mečiar, but also by the debate on the most suitable approach for reforms. In
this context, it would be no surprise to see that in the next elections of June 2006, the
social security reform will play the determinant factor driving the political behaviour of
Slovak citizens. 
Despite  the  importance  of  this  actor-centred  explanation,  the  political  behaviour  of
citizens and politicians is still not sufficient to fully understand the path of social security
reforms in the Vizégrad countries. The role played by already existing institutions must
also be seriously taken into account. As the next paragraph will summarize,  reforms in
the mode of access, benefit structure, management and financing of the new welfare
state was carried out according to two main principles, which were deeply rooted in the
communist and pre-communist past. The first principle was driven by the experience of
the  excessive  standardization  of  economic  and  social  life  caused  by  the  regulatory
mechanisms of the central  planned economy, which  produced the undesired effect of
limiting work performance in the absence of incentives, stagnation or even regression of
have been due. Unexpectedly, Špidla, instead of supporting the already existent “opposition contract”, decided
on campaigning against the ODS, but he was then subjected to a coup d’ état conducted by the members of his
own party.
modernization (Machonin 1997). As a result, the aim of politicians and policy-makers was
to provide a differentiated socio-economic system in which the personal aspirations of
citizens could be better realized. In the areas of social policy, this coincided with the re-
introduction of provisions based on occupational diversity, which also had a long tradition
in these countries. At the same time, forty years of communism had produced a system
of formal and informal norms that made an extremely differentiate access to welfare
provisions not a viable political decision. The state paternalist welfare state established
during communism could not simply be dismantled overnight, especially in times where
the costs of the economic transition would primarily lay on the poorer social classes. The
reinforcement of Bismarck institutions, never completely dismantled during communism,
was then the most obvious option.
3.2 The Four Institutional Variables
Nowadays, the mode of access to benefits in the four Vizégrad countries is based on the
Bismarck  model,  but  significant  universal  aspirations  exist.  In  the  Czech  Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, the access to pensions is regulated by the payment of
social insurance contributions, but a strong link to social assistance provisions (the so-
called fourth pillar)  ensures coverage for those people who, otherwise, would remain
uninsured (Wagener 2002; Tomka 2004). The same applies with regards to health care
protection. All  these countries now grant health services upon the payment of health
insurance  premiums,  but  the  state  is  often  called  to  cover  the  deficit  of  the  newly
established  health  funds  and to  ensure  that  numerous  unprotected citizens,  such  as
unemployed, students, children, pensioners, and persons in need are covered (Cerami
2005, 2006c).
Though primarily Bismarckian in its character38, the benefit structure of current Central
and Eastern European welfare  institutions  can be described as an ambiguous  mix  of
differentiation and equalization of provisions. Just to quote few example, in the Czech
Republic, pensions are financed by social insurance contributions and are calculated on
the basis of two amounts: (1) a basic flat-rate based on citizenship and (2) an additional
earnings-related component based on the professional status. The flat-rate component of
pensions plays the role of equalization at the expense of the middle and upper classes
(Consensus II 1999; Tomeš 2003; MISSOC 2005). In Hungary, most of health services
are included in the mandatory health package, which are covered by the compulsory
insurance scheme. As a consequence, there is little space for additional private health
care services and because of this the majority of the citizens have access to the same
provisions  (Gál et al. 2003, p. 78; MISSOC 2005). For Kornai (2001), in fact, the current
38 In the four Vizégrad countries, welfare benefits are: (a) primarily financed by social insurance contributions;
(b) earnings-related; and (c) granted on the basis of the professional record.
Hungarian health care system still displays some characteristics of “market socialism”. In
Poland, unemployment benefits are financed by social insurance contributions, but their
amount is now granted on a flate-rate basis. A differentiated welfare system also exists
for farmers, who are insured by KRUS (Social Insurance Fund for Farmers) in contrast to
ZUS  (Social  Insurance  Institution),  which  is  responsible  for  employees.  In  KRUS,
pensions  are  still  based  on  a  first  pay-as-you-go  component  (I  pillar),  while  health
insurance has higher universal aspirations (MISSCEEC 2002; MISSOC 2005). In Slovakia
the aim of the new pension formula is clearly that of encouraging professional diversity,
but the system, work-related in scope, has still universal aspirations. Article 39 of the
Slovak  Constitution  affirms  the  right  to  adequate  material  provisions  for  pensioners
establishing a strong linkage with the minimum guaranteed income (MISSCEEC 2002;
MISSOC 2005).
In  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  decentralization  and  devolution  of  responsibilities  to
regional and local authorities has been the main characteristic of reforms, although some
form of re-centralization is observable. Devolution can be explained as a reaction to the
communist  over-centralization,  which  had  neglected  local  requests  in  order  to  meet
national priorities. As it can be seen by the administrative organization, the system is
nowadays  much  more  differentiated.  In  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland  and
Slovakia, the Ministries of Labour and Social Affairs are responsible for planning policies
and drawing up legislation for the overall social security system, with the exception of the
health care, which is, usually, under the control of the Ministry of Health. Distinct and
autonomous bodies (such as the Czech Administration of Social Security, the Hungarian
Central Administration of National Pension Insurance, KRUS and ZUS in Poland, or the
Slovak Social Insurance Agency) administer the new social insurance system and pay the
benefits through their  district  and local  offices. Also the role of  trade unions, usually
addressed as the weakest link in the reforms process (Ghellab and Vaughan-Whitehead
2003), has  now  drastically  increased. Despite  common  assumptions,  tripartite
consultations  have  played a  crucial  role  in  the  first  stage  of  reforms by helping  the
introduction of a new welfare system, in the second stage by facilitating the continuation
of reforms mediating different interests and needs, and in the third stage of reforms, by
calling attention to the necessity to include a social dimension of transformation (Ladó
2003, p. 258). In this context, it can be affirmed that not the absence of corporatism,
but rather a form of  state-led corporatism39 is the main characteristic of the transition
toward a market economy. 
39 The concept of state-led corporatism has been introduced by Vivien Schmidt during a private discussion at
the Centre d’ètudes europèennes of Sciences Po (Paris) on 7th April 2006. Some reference can also be found in
Schmidt (2002).
Finally, as far as the financing mechanism is concerned, the general trend occurring in
the four Vizégrad countries seems to lead to a rapid devolution of state responsibility in
financing  the  system  of  social  protection  through  an  increase  in  social  insurance
contributions  and  a  gradual  equalization  of  employers’  and  employees’  participation
rates.  With respect to the important issue of how, and how much, taxes are levied on
citizens,  while  during  communism  the  system was  distributive  in  scope,  since  1989
taxation tends to produce a diversified impact on individuals. In Slovakia the revenues
from taxes, as percentage of GDP, are the lowest (30.6%), followed by Poland (35.8%),
Czech Republic (36.2%) and Hungary (39.1%), which is the only country close to the
EU15 average (40.6%). Looking at the structure of taxation it is clear to see that social
insurance  contributions  as  percentage  of  total  taxation  in  Hungary  are  equal  to  the
contribution rates in the EU 15, but substantially higher in Czech Republic, Poland and
Slovakia.  However, it  is  also important to consider how direct and indirect taxes are
levied on citizens, since this may influence the final amount of money that people have at
their disposal (or their purchase power), thus influencing the final redistributive character
of the welfare state40 (Adema and Ladaique 2005). What is interesting to note here is
how the structure of taxation in the four Vizégrad countries is for the most part based on
social insurance contributions and indirect taxes, while direct taxes remain significantly
below the EU15 average, both as percentage of total taxation and as percentage of GDP
(see  Table  3).  This  implies  that  taxation  continues  to  have  a  dual  orientation:  an
employment-related character due to the payment of social insurance contributions, and
a collective character due to the revenues raised by indirect taxes, such as VAT and taxes
on  products,  which  tend  to  be  accumulated  more  independently  of  individual’s  own
income.
40 Direct taxes are taxes levied directly on an individuals’ income (such as personal and corporate tax), while
indirect taxes are usually levied on products (such as VAT, taxes on products or on productions). Taxes on
productions are more difficult to discern, since it is not easy for citizens to quantify their impact immediately.
Table 3 The Structure of Taxation (2003)
Total
taxes %
of
GDP
Indirect
taxes % of 
total
taxation
Direct taxes 
% of
 total
taxation
Social security
contributions % of
total taxations
Indirect
taxes %
of
GDP
Direct
taxes % of
GDP
Social
security
contributions
% of GDP
Czech
Rep. 36.2 31.4 27.1 41.5 11.4 9.8 15.0
Hungary 39.1 42.4 25.0 32.5 16.6 9.8 12.7
Poland 35.8 42.8 20.1 39.4 15.3 7.2 14.1
Slovakia 30.6 37.6 23.6 40.2 11.5 7.2 12.3
EU15 40.6 34.6 33.1 32.5 13.6 13.7 13.2
Source: Eurostat 2005.
Finally,  the  four  Vizégrad  countries  spend  less  than  Western  Europe  in  welfare
programmes, with public welfare expenditures that remain substantially below the EU 15
average41. In 2001, for example, the total public social expenditures were equal to 20.1%
of GDP in the Czech Republic and Hungary, 23.0% in Poland and 17.9% in Slovakia,
while the EU15 average was equal to 24.0%. Similar considerations apply to old age,
health care, family  and unemployment benefits,  although there are some exceptions,
such as the case of the Czech Republic for health care and Hungary for family benefits.
Here, what is interesting to note is that despite the existence of raising unemployment,
only Poland, comes close to the  EU15 average for expenditures on unemployment of
1.2% of GDP (see Table 4).    
41 Please note that very little, information is available in the OECD Social Expenditure Database 2004 on private
welfare  expenditures  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  The  analysis  here  thus  concerns  only  public  social
expenditures, that is, the expenditures provided by public authorities, with the exclusion of compulsory and
voluntary private programmes. Private provisions corresponds, at the moment, only to a small part of total
social expenditures, usually not above one percentage point of GDP.  
Table 4. Public Social Expenditures % of GDP (2001)
Total Old Age Health care Family
Benefits
Unemployment
Czech Rep. 20.1 6.7 6.7 1.6 0.2
Hungary 20.1 8.0 5.1 2.5 0.4
Poland 23.0 8.5 4.4 0.9 1.0
Slovakia 17.9 6.7 5.0 1.5 0.5
EU15 24.0 8.8 6.1 2.2 1.2
Source: OECD Social Security Expenditure Database 2004
Conclusion
If one looks at the reform trajectories prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, similarities with
the reform trajectories in other Bismarckian countries (such as France) can be found.
These similarities can partly be explained by similar external economic shocks that the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe were facing (such as the oil crisis of the 1970s),
but also by the existence of similar Bismarck-oriented welfare institutions. Expansion of
welfare provisions during the 1970s and the early 1980s in CEECs was largely associated
to an increase in external debt and in social  insurance contributions.  Modifications in
social policy remained under the dominant communist logic, but Bismarckian features,
already present, became more preponderant (the golden age). After a brief period, where
welfare institutions were called to amortize the costs of economic transition (the era of
forced expansion), attempts of welfare retrenchment characterized the policy trends in
these countries in the 1990s. In comparison with other Western democracies, the political
discourse in these years focused on the necessity to ensure system and financial stability.
In the Central and Eastern European case, this was also linked to the future consolidation
of democratic institutions (the era of retrenchment’s attempts). More recently, alteration
and amendments in the national legislation are taking place in almost all welfare state
sectors, involving the reduction, but also, in some cases, the expansion of the level of
benefits (first order changes), as well as the introduction of new calculation rules, new
kinds of entitlements and benefits (second order changes). These changes tend to go
beyond simple “retrenchment” policies, since they aim to recalibrate the system to the
new emerging  social  problems,  which  are  now different  for  the  early  days  of  post-
communist transition (the era beyond retrenchment). 
Central and Eastern European welfare states can in fact be seen as a laboratory where
new  social  policy  instruments  (such  as  the  three-pillar  scheme  or  the  Minimum
Subsistence Level) are tested and, if problems arise, these instruments are immediately
modified and adjusted to the new needs. The best examples of policy learning in the
region are the continuous adjustments in the pension and health care sector42. Here, first
42 The Czech pension insurance Act No. 155/1995 has been amended several times since its establishment. The
latest revision, Act No. 264/2002, entered into force in July 2002  concerns  the increase of old age benefits
based on the increase of consumption prices and real salary index. In Hungary, the latest amendment of the
pension legislation, Law 54/2004 amending Law 82/1997 on private pension and private pension funds, gives
certain  persons  the  possibility  to  change  from the  private  pension  scheme to  the  social  security  pension
scheme. In Poland, the latest amendment of the pension legislation, Act of 30 April 2004 on early retirement
(Text No. 1552), provides the new rules for eligibility criteria as well as the monthly amount of benefits. In
Slovakia,  the  Act  No.  43/2004  on  pension  saving  schemes,  which  amends  Act  No.  461/2003  on  social
insurance, now  forbids any discrimination (direct or indirect) concerning pension saving schemes (e.g. sex,
marital or civil status, race, colour, language, age, etc.). Same considerations apply to the health insurance
legislation,  which,  in  all  four  Vizégrad  countries,  has  primarily  involved  a  redefinition  of  responsibilities
previously given to local authority, as well as an increase in coverage for non-protected groups. For a complete
and second order changes primarily involve the redefinition of the level of benefits, rules
and principles, according to more socially oriented goals than those proposed by the first
neo-liberal governments. Protection against unemployment, social assistance and family
benefits are not an exception to this trend.
Thus, as argued in previous work (Cerami 2005), Central and Eastern European countries
seem to develop around a new welfare logic, which has path-dependent and innovative
components.  These  have  been  identified  in:  (a)  the  re-enforcement  of  Bismarckian-
oriented policies as heritage of the Austro-Hungarian empire (path-dependent); (b) the
maintenance of egalitarian and universal aspirations as fostered during the communist
period (path-dependent); and (c) the introduction of market-friendly welfare provisions
(innovative). If analyzed in their global context, the abovementioned characteristics are
evidence for a significant degree of cohesion among these welfare states in transition and
may allow for the emergence of a new and unique model of solidarity, in which different
worlds  of  welfare coexist  and  are  recombined  together.  To  use  a  definition  recently
provided by Lamping and Rϋb (2004, 2005) for Germany,  the welfare regime in Central
and Eastern Europe can,  therefore,  be described in terms of  a “recombinant  welfare
state43”,  where  Bismarck  features  remain  preponderant.  In  fact,  as  Kathleen  Thelen
(2004,  p.293)  puts  it:  “formal  institutions  do  not  survive  long  stretches  of  time  by
standing still”. To conclude, as highlighted by other papers (see, for instance, France by
Bruno Palier 2000, 2005, Spain by Ana Guillén 2005, Germany by Karl Hinrichs 2005),
Bismarckian welfare states are not as “frozen” as they seem. Rather, they are defrosting
their most immovable objects (Pierson 1998): a process that is leading to a hybridization
of the system.  
and updated list of all amendments in the social security legislation, please see the ILO-NATLEX database. 
43 For Lamping and Rϋb (2004, 2005), the German welfare state is in transition from the classical Bismarckian
type to an “uncertain something else” that the authors cautiously call a “conservative universalism”. Please
note that the term recombinant property has first been used by Stark (1996) and Stark and Bruszt (1998) to
describe the evolution of Central and Eastern European markets.  
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Table A1. Reform Trajectories
Types of change Context Diagnosis Content of the policy Politics of the reforms Consequences
The Golden Age
- Economic downturn
(mid 1970’s onwards),
- social budget deficits
Social benefits can help the
system and (un)democratic
stability
* Preservation of full
employment
* raise in social contribution
* change in the generosity of
the benefits (upwards)
* Additional financing
necessary raised through
external debt
* Raise in social contribution
* Unwillingness to cut social
benefits
* Additional financing
necessary raised through
external debt
* Continuous welfare expansion
beyond the possibility of the
central planned economy
* Increasing inefficiencies of
such policies (impossibility to
cope with Western achievements
in living standards)
* Re-enforcement of Bismarck
features as existing before
communism
Forced expansion
(before retrenchment’s
attempts)
NOTE: Temporary and due to
exceptional circumstances
-Economic collapse following
the dissolution of
communism
- Introduction of market
economy
- Preparation to a new
economic mechanism
- Massive socio, political,
economic and demographic
changes
The democratic transition has
to be rescued, and
consolidated
* increase in the
contributions to social
insurance benefits
* Introduction of generous
early retirement, protection
against unemployment  and
establishment of basic safety
net
* Reinforcement of Bismarck
features
* Negotiated, but based on
TINA (There Is No
Alternative)
* The state takes some
responsibilities for the
collapse of communism,
while at the same time
promoting differentiation in
risk management
* From social to more individual
insurance
* Anomalies of the new system
covered under state
responsibility
Retrenchment’s attempts - Severe economic
deterioration
- End of what remained of
Keynesianism
-Global and
European orientation/
coordination of economic
and social policies
* Welfare systems are seen
as partly the cause of the
crisis: excessive state
involvement reinforce social
exclusion; income
maintenance is disincentive to
work;
state involvement damages
competitivity and creates
unemployment; state
management rules hinder
reform capacities
* increasing importance of
targeted and market-based
benefits
* expansion of private
provisions
* new mode of management
(private)
* Negotiated, but STRONGLY
based on TINA
(There Is No Alternative)
Weakening of state
responsibility, while increasing
social insurances mechanisms
and actors
Beyond Retrenchment - EU immediate pre–
accession
- EU Enlargement
Welfare systems need a
profound adaptation to the
new EU based socio-economic
context
- Recombinant
implementation of EU, OECD,
World Bank and IMF ideas in
the light of the EU
Enlargement
Reconsideration of neo-liberal
approach (private pillars in
pension, and health
insurance are recalibrated)
* Activation of unemployed
* Competition in health
* Emphasis on social
inclusion due to Lisbon
European Council
* Negotiated, but based on a
new, more socially-aware
approach
* Recalibration of previous
reforms 
* hybridization of the system 
